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No Time for NEPA: Trade Agreements
on a Fast Track
Steve Charnovitz*
In June 1993, a decision by U.S. District Court Judge
Charles R. Richey rocked the U.S. trade policy community.1
Judge Richey ruled that an environmental impact statement
(EIS) had to be prepared for the North American Free Trade
Agreement 2 (NAFTA). 3 The decision was seen as being trouble-
some in several ways. It could have delayed or possibly derailed
NAFTA, which was due to roll into force on January 1, 1994. It
threatened to interfere with the well-greased fast-track machin-
ery for implementing trade agreements. Moreover, it seemed to
legitimize the view that NAFTA might be bad for the
environment.
As things turned out, little damage was done.4 Judge
Richey's decision was overruled by the U.S. Court of Appeals. 5
NAFTA was approved by Congress and went into force as sched-
uled. The environment has not suffered any obvious harm as a
result of NAFTA. So what's the problem? This Article argues
that the U.S. government does indeed have a problem, because
its mechanisms are inadequate for assuring the sensitivity of
* Policy Director, Competitiveness Policy Council. The author wishes to
thank Judy Bello, Dan Farber, and Patti Goldman for their comments and
critiques.
1. Public Citizen v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F.Supp.
21 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and cert. denied, 114 S.Ct.
685 (1994). See generally The National Environmental Policy Act and the North
American Free Trade Agreement: Hearing #219 Before the Committee on Envi-
ronment and Public Works, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (July 22, 1993) [hereinafter
Senate Hearing].
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mexico-
Canada, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
3. Public Citizen, 822 F.Supp. at 30.
4. Actually, it could be argued that the decision benefited NAiTA by unit-
ing the pro-NAFTA camp for the first time during the Clinton Administration.
5. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 685 (1994).
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trade agreements to environmental and health concerns. 6 This
analytical deficiency magnifies in importance when one reflects
on the resurgence of protectionism in the United States. 7
In any mainstream American bookstore today one can find
books inveighing against free trade and highlighting the dan-
gers of trade to the environment.8 This is a new development in
the post-World War II period.9 Of course, for some time there
have been books advocating fairer trade (or tougher policies
against Japan), but an actual rejection of free trade is a signifi-
cant departure. 10 Indeed, some authors in this new school are
actually proud to identify themselves as "protectionist.""1
The environmental critique of free trade is of recent vintage.
Two decades ago, there was a burst of scholarship about the
dangers of economic growth to the environment, but interna-
tional trade was not cast as a culprit. 12 Today, the impact of
international trade and trade rules on the environment is
viewed as a major problem. 13 The analyses offered by some com-
6. See AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE 343 (1992) ("environmental stan-
dards must be included among the criteria for deciding when to liberalize trad-
ing arrangements with each country").
7. For background on protectionism in general, see JAGDISH BHAGWATI,
PROTECTIONISM ch. 3 (1988). For a good review of some trends favorable to
trade, see I.M. DESTLER & JOHN. S. ODELL, ANTI-PROTECTION: CHANGING
FORCES IN UNITED STATES TRADE POLITICS (1987).
8. See, e.g., RALPH NADER ET AL., THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE: GATT,
NAFTA, AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE POWER (1993); THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE (Ricardo Grinspun & Maxwell A.
Cameron eds., 1993); RAVI BATRA, THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE: A PLAN FOR
AMERICA'S ECONOMIC REVIVAL (1993). These issues are also covered, on a day to
day basis, in two conferences on the Internet.
9. On U.S. trade policy in the post-War period, see generally STEFANIE
ANN LENWAY, THE POLITICS OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE: PROTECTION, Ex-
PANSION, AND ESCAPE (1985).
10. One exception is the work of John M. Culbertson, an economics profes-
sor at the University of Wisconsin. See JOHN M. CULBERTSON, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST (1984); JOHN M. CULBERTSON, THE DAN-
GERS OF "FREE TRADE" (1985). Culbertson was viewed by many colleagues as
offering antiquated views. As it turned out, he anticipated the intellectual rein-
vigoration of protectionism. See also Bruce Stokes, Debunking Free Trade, 16
NAT'L J. 1831 (1984).
11. See TIM LANG & COLIN HINES, THE NEW PROTECTIONISM: PROTECTING
THE FUTURE AGAINST FREE TRADE (1993).
12. See, e.g., ECONOMIC GROWTH VS. THE ENVIRONMENT (Warren A. Johnson
& John Hardesty eds., 1971). In a history of the ecological movement, interna-
tional trade is barely mentioned. See ANNA BRAMWELL, ECOLOGY IN THE 20TH
CENTURY: A HISTORY (1989).
13. For a discussion of the major issues from diverse perspectives, see
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY (Durwood Zaelke
et al. eds., 1993). For a portrayal to generalists, see Monika Bauerlein,
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mentators are startling and frightening. For example, Ravi Ba-
tra writes that "since trade pollutes the earth, it is essential that
it be kept to the minimum. Free trade leads to maximum trade,
but environmental considerations call for minimum trade."' 4
Lang and Hines point out that the
historical practice of protectionism we call the old protectionism be-
cause it was used by big and powerful interests to pursue their goals.
The second we call the New Protectionism because it seeks to protect
public interests, like health or the environment or safety standards or
reduction of poverty, against the interests of unrestrained trade.15
Herman E. Daly explains that:
[f]ree trade is likely to stimulate the growth of throughput. It allows a
country in effect to exceed its domestic regenerative and absorptive
limits by "importing" those capacities from other countries .... Meas-
ures to integrate national economies further should now be treated as
a bad idea unless proved otherwise in specific cases.
16
Walter Russell Mead states that:
The parties to both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1 7
(GATT) and NAFTA have failed to resist - and have sometimes even
encouraged - the development of trade rules that undercut American
interests. GATT does not, for example, require companies wishing to
participate in international trade to observe the most minimal safety,
health, and environmental standards.1
8
Whatever one thinks about the validity of these points, they
are noteworthy in being expressed so straightforwardly. It is
unclear why such views are flowering at this time. 19 One factor
may be the Clinton Administration's rhetoric in favor of man-
aged trade, particularly in early 1993.20 After all, if trade can be
GATTzilla: Rethinking the Global Economy, UTNE READER, No. 61, Jan.-Feb.
1994, at 19.
14. BATRA, supra note 8, at 245-46. Batra is a professor of economics.
15. LANG & HINES, supra note 11, at 6-7.
16. Herman E. Daly, The Perils of Free Trade, Sci. Am., Nov. 1993, at 50,
57. In an interesting explication of how comparative advantage works, Daly
illustrates that the mobility of capital from Country A to Country B could lead
to a situation where Country B produces everything and A produces nothing.
Id. at 52 (see the empty box). And that in a journal about science!
17. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
18. Walter Russell Mead, The New Global Marketplace, in CHANGING
AMERICA: BLUEPRINTS FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION 196, 203 (Mark Green ed.,
1992).
19. Other exponents of the new school include Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Wil-
liam Greider, Thea Lee, David Morris, Ralph Nader, Ross Perot, Ian Robinson,
Steven Shrybman, and Lori Wallach.
20. See, e.g., Clinton Chief Economic Adviser Lays Out Two-Track Ap-
proach to Trade Policy, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 22, 1993, at 1; Kantor, Brown
Say U.S. Determined to Enforce Chip Deal with Japanese, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Mar. 5, 1993 at 1; Kantor Says U.S., Japan Need to Review Commitments on
1994]
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managed for mercantilist purposes, managing it for environ-
mental purposes would seem even better.
This Article discusses the need for environmental assess-
ments of trade agreements and how such assessments can best
be carried out. Part I discusses the historical authority of the
President to negotiate trade agreements, and how that authority
has evolved into and affected fast-track authority. Part II dis-
cusses the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)2 1 and
whether it is applicable to trade agreements. Part III discusses
how the competing policies of fast track and NEPA played out in
the NAFTA debate, specifically in the case of Public Citizen v.
U.S. Trade Representative.2 2 Part IV discusses the reality of
how NAFTA affected existing U.S. laws by demonstrating the
Agreement's impact on U.S. health laws. Part V concludes that
environmental assessments of trade agreements are necessary,
and considers how the U.S. government might improve the pro-
cess of considering the environmental aspects of trade
agreements.
I. PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY, TRADE AGREEMENTS
AND FAST-TRACK
Because of its venerable but peculiar form of government,
the United States can have difficulties in making trade agree-
ments. Trade negotiations are an inherently executive function,
but the President has no express authority under the Constitu-
tion for conducting them. The Constitution gives to Congress
the authority "to regulate commerce with foreign nations."23 Of
course, the President is not precluded from conducting negotia-
tions of any kind with foreign sovereigns. If the President
makes a treaty, the consent of the U.S. Senate must be obtained,
Auto Parts Purchase, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 5, 1993, at 4; Trade Officials,
Senators Embrace "Results-Oriented" Japan Policy, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 19,
1993, at 6; Administration Steps Up Pressure on China to Open Services Market
to U.S. Firms, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Apr. 2, 1993, at 7; USTR Reviewing Foreign
Compliance with Trade Agreements, Eyes 301 Cases, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Apr.
16, 1993, at 17.
21. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat.
852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.).
22. Public Citizen v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F.Supp.
21 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and cert. denied, 114 S.Ct.
685 (1994).
23. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. There are other countries where trade
agreements have to be approved by the legislature - for example, Canada, Ja-
pan, Mexico, and Switzerland. Many of these, however, are parliamentary
systems.
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by a vote of two-thirds, before it can be ratified. 24 If the treaty
involves any changes in U.S. tariffs, as many trade accords do,
the President must also secure legislation which alters the tar-
iffs or gives him authority to do so. 25 Such legislation must orig-
inate in the U.S. House of Representatives. 26
These Constitutional strictures put the President at a dis-
advantage vis-a-vis other governments. While the President can
negotiate anything with foreign countries, the other countries
are not going to negotiate unless they believe that those commit-
ments will be honored. The other countries know that the Presi-
dent's ability to deliver on such promises depends upon
Congress. Given this predicament, foreign plenipotentiaries
may be wary of making deals with American impotentiaries.
Congress has long recognized this predicament and has
taken steps to remedy this Presidential infirmity. Grants of ne-
gotiating authority to the President go back at least as early as
1798, when Congress empowered President Adams to terminate
the trade embargo against France if a modus vivendi could be
reached.27 Throughout the 19th century, Congress experi-
mented with many different types of authorizations to the Presi-
dent regarding trade. Yet little commercial liberalization
eventuated, in part because the grants of authority were too
narrow.
28
In the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Congress
clothed the President with broad authority to negotiate trade
agreements and to lower U.S. tariffs. 29 As David Lake has per-
ceptively observed, this law "contained little that had not al-
ready been enacted into previous tariff acts .... [The Act] is
unique, however, in delegating all of these various powers to the
president simultaneously."30 The authority given to the Presi-
24. Id. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2. See SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING
AND ENFORCEMENT 195-99 (2d ed. 1916) and references therein.
25. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
26. For example, Congress enacted a law to implement the Canada-U.S.
Reciprocal Tariff Arrangement of 1911. See Law of July 26, 1911, ch. 3, 37 Stat.
4 (1911).
27. Law of June 13, 1798, ch. 53, 1 Stat. 565 (1798).
28. For a good study of the late 19th century authorizations, see CAROLYN
RHODES, RECIPROCITY, U.S. TRADE POLICY, AND THE GATT REGIME 21-52 (1993).
See also JOHN M. DOBSON, Two CENTURIES OF TARIFFS: THE BACKGROUND AND
EMERGENCE OF THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION (1976).
29. Law of June 12, 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. §§ 1351-1354 (1988)). Previously, section 320 of the Tariff Act of 1930
had provided such authority for trade agreements relating to advertising mat-
ter. This was trackless authority.
30. DAVID A. LAKE, POWER, PROTECTION, AND FREE TRADE 205 (1988).
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dent was plenary. He could proclaim tariff reductions 31 and
make other trade commitments without any further action by
Congress.3 2 One might view this as trackless authority.33
With the exception of brief expirations, this authority was
continued by Congress until October 1967. 34 At that time, it
lapsed until the enactment of the Trade Act of 1974,35 which
provided new trackless tariff-cutting authority for five years.3 6
Because the new multilateral trade negotiations (i.e., the Tokyo
Round) were to consider a broad range of non-tariff barriers, it
was recognized that the traditional authority was not enough.
The President needed to be able to show other nations, particu-
larly the European Community, that he could deliver on any
commitments to change U.S. law. Policymakers remembered
the previous Kennedy trade round in the 1960s, where two
agreements had been reached requiring U.S. implementing leg-
islation and both ended in frustration. In one episode involving
the anti-dumping code, implementing legislation was enacted
that negated the agreement reached in Geneva.37 In the other,
involving the American selling price, 38 the implementing legis-
lation was stalled in a House committee. 39
31. In a bow to protectionists, the Act permitted the President to raise or
lower tariffs. But, as Cordell Hull noted in his memoirs, "it was obvious that we
would reduce them, since no other country would sign an agreement to increase
our tariffs." See 1 CORDELL HULL, THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 359 (1948).
32. This authority was used repeatedly for bilateral trade agreements.
From 1947 to 1948, it was also used for the multilateral GATT agreement. See
DOBSON, supra note 28, at 106-14.
33. The President has other trackless authority, not discussed here, to ne-
gotiate agreements that limit agricultural and textile imports and authority to
enforce those agreements. He also has authority to impose restrictions on non-
parties to the agreements. See 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1988).
34. See DOBSON, supra note 28, at 144, for a list of the extensions of trade
negotiating authority and their dates. See also 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1988) and
notes therein. In addition, Pub. L. No. 89-283 § 201 provided tariff proclama-
tion authority for one day (subject to Congressional disapproval) for the Can-
ada-U.S. Agreement Concerning Automotive Products. See 17 U.S.T. 1372.
35. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975).
36. This authority was narrower than previous authority in that the proc-
lamation authority did not extend to "other import restrictions." Compare 19
U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1)(B) with 19 U.S.C. §§ 2111(a)(2), 2115 (1982).
37. THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, 1968, H.R. Doc. No. 204, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 9 (1969).
38. This was an arcane and unfair procedure, now discontinued, whereby
the U.S. tariff was based on the American selling price of a competing good
rather than on the landed value of the import. See KENNETH W. DAM, THE
GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 189-92 (1970).
39. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 54 (1989).
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To deal with this difficulty, President Nixon proposed that
he be permitted to effectuate trade agreements subject to a one-
House legislative veto. 40 The idea (surprisingly, in retrospect)
passed the House, but stalled in the Senate.41 Instead, a new
fast-track procedure was crafted to assure that the implement-
ing legislation needed for a trade agreement would be voted on
by Congress unamended within sixty days in session 42 (or
ninety days for a revenue bill) in the form written by the Admin-
istration.43 Of course, there was no guarantee that Congress
would pass the legislation44 - numerous consultation and advi-
sory procedures were written into the law to increase the likeli-
hood that the Executive Branch would stay in sync with
Congress. 45
Fast track has two components: non-amendability, and a
guaranteed vote. Non-amendability was designed to deal with
the situation exemplified by the implementation of the anti-
dumping code. 46 The guaranteed vote was designed to deal with
the situation exemplified by the American selling price agree-
ment.47 Actually, the idea of non-amendability of trade agree-
ments was not new. The Canadian Reciprocity Act of 1911 had
40. See PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RICHARD
NIXON, 1973, at 262 (1975).
41. See I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 62-65 (1986).
42. Session days are neither calendar days nor legislative days. The defini-
tion of this "day" is at 19 U.S.C. § 2191(e)(3) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
43. Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 151, 88 Stat. 2317 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2191
(1988 & Supp. 1993)). Fast track procedures have been modified over the inter-
vening period, but these changes are not significant for the purpose of this
Article.
44. As Judith Bello has observed, however, "[w]ith the fast track proce-
dures, trading partners have at least a reasonable degree of confidence in the
President's ability to speak with one voice for the United States in trade negoti-
ations." Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 55 (statement of Judith H. Bello). See
also Alan F. Holmer & Judith H. Bello, The Fast Track Debate: A Prescription
for Pragmatism, 26 INT'L LAw. 183 (1992).
45. For a discussion of fast track's formal and informal procedures and
some thoughtful proposals for reform, see Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track
and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 170 (1992). For further
background on fast track, see Edmund Sim, Derailing the Fast-Track for Inter-
national Trade Agreements, 5 FLA. INT'L L.J. 471 (1990).
46. See supra text accompanying note 37.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39. The guaranteed vote ap-
pears to have been unprecedented. In 1979, the Senate Finance Committee
characterized it as a "unique Constitutional experiment." S. REP. No. 249, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979). There were about a dozen prior concurrent resolu-
tions that had privilege, some approval and some disapproval, but no guaran-
teed vote on legislation. See JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., § 1013 (1975).
1994] 201
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provided for an up-or-down vote on future trade agreements
with Canada.48 In 1913, the Underwood Tariff had extended
this to reciprocal trade agreements with any country.49
Although enacted as part of a law, fast track is also a rule of
both the House and the Senate.50 The Senate rule is the proce-
durally-significant one. Since a majority of the House can al-
ways work its will (eventually), fast track serves only a
facilitative purpose in the House.5 ' It is interesting to note that
before considering NAFTA the House passed a new rule that su-
perseded fast track.5 2 Its real significance lies in the Senate,
where supermajorities are required to forestall amendments or
bring legislation to a vote.
The fast track procedure was used successfully in 1979 to
make changes in U.S. law necessary to implement the Tokyo
Round trade agreements.53 The trackless tariff authority ex-
pired in 1980.5 4 The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 extended
48. Law of July 26, 1911, ch. 3, § 3, 37 Stat. 4, 12 (1911) (repealed). The
exact language was that "said trade agreements before becoming operative
shall be submitted to the Congress of the United States for ratification or rejec-
tion." Id.
49. Law of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 4, 38 Stat. 114, 192 (1913) (repealed). No
trade agreements were submitted under this authority or the 1911 authority.
50. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(a)(2) (1988). One Justice Department brief states
that the fast track is a rule "[blecause Congress can neither encumber the Pres-
ident's powers to negotiate with foreign governments and transmit legislation
to Congress, nor bind a future Congress to particular rules governing its pro-
ceedings .... ." See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative For Summary Judgment at
8, Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 782
F.Supp. 139 (D.D.C. 1992) (No. 91-1916), aff'd, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
[hereinafter Motion in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judg-
ment]. But neither of these "explanations" clarify why fast track is a rule
within a law. First, using a rule makes fast track enforceable within each
House. Second, using a rule preserves the prerogative of each House to change
the rule independently of the other and independently of the President.
51. It adds nothing to the power of the House majority to pass a rule impos-
ing a fast track, and detracts nothing from the power of the majority to pass a
rule negating fast track. See JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 405, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 59, 729a (1992).
Of course, fast track can be helpful in the House in moving a bill out of
committees.
52. See 139 CONG. REC. H9856, 9872 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993) (debate on
H.R. 311). This rule waived all points of order and limited debate to eight
hours.
53. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979).
54. Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 102(b), 88 Stat. 1978, 1982-83 (1975)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988)). Some residual authority remained for two
years. See § 124, 19 U.S.C. 2134 (1988).
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fast track authority for non-tariff barriers until 1988. 55 In 1984,
Congress added new procedural requirements for the use of this
authority for bilateral trade agreements.5 6 This 1979 authority
(as modified in 1984) was used for the approval of the Israel-U.S.
free trade agreement 57 and the Canada-U.S. free trade agree-
ment.58 The President did not have proclamation authority in
either case.
In the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 59
Congress provided new negotiating authority for both bilateral
and multilateral agreements. The bilateral authority provided a
fast track for the entire package. 60 The multilateral authority
provided tariff-cutting authority by proclamation and fast track
for the rest of the package. 61 Both authorities expired 62 in
March 1991, but were extended by President Bush (in the ab-
sence of Congressional disapproval) for two years. 63 The bilat-
eral authority was used in 1992 for entering into NAFTA.64 On
March 2, 1993, both authorities expired. 65 The multilateral au-
thority was later extended to December 15, 1993,66 but without
55. Pub. L. No. 96-39, tit. XI, § 1101, 93 Stat. 144, 307 (1979) (codified at
19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1988 & Supp. 1993)).
56. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, tit. IV, 98 Stat. 2948,
3013 (1984). Some very limited multilateral proclamation authority was pro-
vided for five years for certain high technology goods. Id. § 308.
57. United States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-47, 99 Stat. 82 (1985) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2112
(1988 & Supp. 1993)).
58. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (1988) (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 2112 (1988)).
59. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.
(1988)).
60. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2902(c), 2903(a), 2903(b) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
61. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2902(a), 2903(a), 2903(b) (1988 & Supp. 1993). It is inter-
esting to note that this multilateral authority was available for the tariff com-
ponents of NAFTA, but would not have permitted fully free trade (i.e., zero
tariffs) because of the statutory limits on tariff cutting.
62. All dates in this paragraph are the final dates on which the President
can notify Congress that he intends to enter into a trade agreement.
63. THE EXTENSION OF FAST TRACK PROCEDURES, H.R. Doc. No. 51, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
64. See Letter to Congressional Leaders on the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1689 (Sept. 18, 1992). The President
does not actually state whether he was using the multilateral or the bilateral
authority. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
65. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2902(a)(1), 2902(c)(1), 2903(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
66. Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Pub. L. No. 103-
49, 107 Stat. 239 (1993). The President made this notification for the Uruguay
Round on December 15, 1993.
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trackless (i.e., proclamation) authority for tariffs. 67 In other
words, the President's tariff-cutting authority, which had begun
in 1934, was discontinued. All fast-track authority for trade ne-
gotiations ceased on December 15, 1993.68
Since fast track authority is a discretionary act of both
Houses of Congress, the legislators may set any condition they
want - including preparation of an EIS.69 The President re-
mains free to avoid such conditions by recommending the
needed trade legislation without the procedural advantage of
fast track (but a return to the "regular order" would be a very
difficult course for the President - and for Congress!70 ). The
President also remains free to submit any trade agreement to
the Senate for consideration as a treaty.71 Of course, any tariff
cuts would probably still have to be legislated under the normal
legislative process for revenue bills.72
In summary, fast track has been the key procedural linch-
pin of U.S. trade policy since 1974. The President gained the
67. Pub. L. No. 103-49, 107 Stat. 239 (1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2902(e)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1993)). The proclamation authority is predicated on
the passage of implementing legislation.
68. Id. Other trade-related fast track authority exists however. See, e.g.,
19 U.S.C. § 2905(c) (1988); United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Imple-
mentation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 100-449, § 304(c), 102 Stat. 1851, 1874
(1985). There is some limited proclamation authority in the implementing leg-
islation for the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and for NAFTA. See North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182,
§§ 201, 202(q), 107 Stat. 2057, 2068, 2086 (1993).
69. The Justice Department agreed in 1991 that the Congress could add an
EIS requirement to fast track conditions. See Motion in Opposition to Plain-
tiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 50, at 42 n. 16. One might also
note that the Congress applied the PAYGO rule, which is a rule within a law, to
NAFTA. See Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, tit. III,
§ 311, 88 Stat. 297, 316 (1974) (as amended); Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 252, 99 Stat. 1037, 1072
(1985) (as amended). This required that the tariff cuts in NAFTA be offset by
tax increases and spending cuts. No one argued that these rules infringed upon
the President's Constitutional "powers" in foreign policy or upon his duty to
recommend measures to the Congress.
70. The regular order during the Kennedy Round was what led to fast
track in the first place. The regular order before the Reciprocal Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1934 had also proved unsatisfactory. See E.E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER,
POLITICS, PRESSURE AND THE TARIFF (1935).
71. Although the NAFTA is commonly referred to as a U.S. "treaty", it is
not. Rather, it is an executive agreement pursuant to Congressional
authorization.
72. For a discussion of how treaties that lower taxes interrelate with reve-
nue legislation, see Irwin Halpern, United States Treaty Obligations, Revenue
Laws, and New Section 7852(d) of the Internal Revenue Code, 5 FLA. INT'L L.J. 1
(1989).
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credibility needed to get foreign governments to negotiate and
Congress retained a final say on accepting the agreements. 73
II. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT AND
TRADE AGREEMENTS
The Constitution establishes no rules on when federal ac-
tions must be accompanied by environmental impact state-
ments. However, in 1969, Congress enacted the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) which includes requirements
for environmental impact statements. 74 Specifically, the law re-
quires that:
all agencies of the Federal Government shall include in every recom-
mendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Fed-
eral actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's envi-
ronment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term produc-
tivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be
implemented.
75
73. One might note that the Justice Department has a different take on the
situation. Their brief states that:
President Bush's negotiation and signing of NAFTA, and President
Clinton's transmittal of NAFTA to Congress and conclusion of related
agreements... [are] undertaken in the exercise of their constitutional
authority over international agreements .... The Trade Acts, and the
fast-track rules they incorporate, recognize the President's primacy in
these international negotiations.
Brief for the Appellants at 12-13, Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5
F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 93-5212), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 685 (1994). The
reference to "related agreements" appears to be an assertion of the President's
Constitutional authority to conclude executive agreements (i.e., the NAFTA
side agreements) with Mexico and Canada.
74. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 855 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et.
seq). The law was not signed by President Nixon until 1970.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988). For a discussion of NEPA procedures, see EN-
VIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, NEPA DESKBOOK (1989). See also DANIEL R.
MANDELKER, NEPA LAw AND LITIGATION: THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POL-
ICY ACT (1990); David A. Wirth, A Matchmaker's Challenge: Marrying Interna-
tional Law and American Environmental Law, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 377, 396-99
(1991).
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For over twenty years, the EIS process has served as one of
the cornerstones of U.S. environmental policy. 76 It has added
greater objectivity, transparency, and public participation to the
decisionmaking process. 77 According to Nicholas C. Yost, NEPA
has become the model for environmental impact assessment
laws in some eighty-four countries, which may make it the "most
imitated law in U.S. history."78 Although it is not clear how
much NEPA has improved policy results, most commentators
would view it as a qualified success. 79
The concept of EIS's has been endorsed in several interna-
tional fora.80 For instance, there is a U.N. Convention on Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context.8 '
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development also af-
firms the importance of environmental reviews.8 2
While neither of these U.N. statements expressly addresses
trade reviews, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) has made recommendations on the trade-
environment nexis.8 3 Specifically, the OECD Council has rec-
ommended that governments
examine trade and environmental policies and agreements for poten-
tially significant effects on other policy areas early in their develop-
ment so that the implications for that other policy area may be
76. In recent years, the U.S. government has pressed for environmental
assessments in international financial institutions. See 22 U.S.C. § 262m-7
(1988 & Supp. 1993); Silvia M. Riechel, Government Hypocrisy and the Extra-
territorial Application of NEPA, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 115 (1994).
77. See Symposium on NEPA at Twenty: The Past, Present and Future of
the National Environmental Policy Act, 20 ENVTL. L. 447 (1990).
78. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 49-50. See also Geoffrey
Wandesforde-Smith, Environmental Impact Assessment, in TRENDS IN ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY AND LAw 101 (Michael Bothe ed., 1980); DAVID HUNTER ET AL.,
UNITED NATIONS, CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
(1993).
79. See Dinah Bear, NEPA at 19: A Primer on an "Old" Law with Solutions
to New Problems, 19 ENvTL. L. REP. 10060, 10062 (1989).
80. For a more detailed discussion, see Peter L. Lallas, NAFTA and Evolv-
ing Approaches to Identify and Address "Indirect" Environmental Impacts of In-
ternational Trade, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 519, 552-53 (1993).
81. United Nations: Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in
a Transboundary Countext, 30 I.L.M. 800 (1991).
82. "Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be
undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse
impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national
authority." Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 17, 31
I.L.M. 874.
83. This reflects an evolution in the thinking on the subject. The chapter
on environmental assessments in an OECD book in 1986 makes no mention of
trade agreements. See OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT 28-33, 156 (1986).
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identified and alternative policy options may be developed for address-
ing concerns. If the examination or review of a trade or environment
policy or agreement identifies concerns, government should act to ad-
dress these concerns.
8 4
In addition, the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (NAAEC) commits parties to "assess, as appropri-
ate, environmental impacts."85
Does NEPA apply to trade agreements?8 6 The language of
NEPA and its legislative history suggest that the focus was
mainly - but certainly not exclusively - on physical projects.87
Still, one should be careful in drawing negative inferences, par-
ticularly since no trade agreement authority existed in 1969.
There is little reason to doubt that a trade agreement could
affect the quality of the human environment.88 In the case of
NAFTA, no doubt exists.8 9 The relationship between NAFTA
and the environment had been recognized in varying degrees
throughout the process.90 Since a bilateral agreement requires
implementing legislation, it is, by definition, a "proposal for leg-
islation."91 Thus, there are grounds for expecting the "responsi-
ble official" to do an EIS for NAFTA. The Bush Administration,
however, refused to prepare an EIS.9 2
84. INSIDE U.S. TRADE, June 11, 1993, at 18.
85. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 13,
1993, art. 2.1(e), 32 I.L.M 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC].
86. Five U.S. Senators and 12 House members filed a brief stating that
NEPA required EISs for all proposed legislation, including trade agreements.
See Brief of Bipartisan Congressional Amici Curiae at 1, Public Citizen v. U.S.
Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 93-5212), cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 685 (1994). The 17 amici offered no evidence in support of their state-
ment. Only one of them was serving in Congress at the time NEPA was
enacted.
87. But EISs are required for more than projects. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.18(b) (1993).
88. But it is not clear whether a trade agreement can be a "proximate
cause" of a change in the physical environment. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v.
People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983).
89. But see Reply Brief fbr the Appellants at 20, Public Citizen v. U.S.
Trade Representative, 5 F.3d'549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 93-5212), cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 685 (1994) (Public Citizen never responds to the fundamental fact
that NAFTA itself has no direct environmental effects). At the same time the
Justice Department was arguing this in Court, the Clinton Administration was
trumpeting NAFTA for its environmental benefits.
90. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. Scso'rr, NORTH AMERICAN
FREE TRADE 131-53 (1992).
91. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.17, 1508.18(b)(1) (1993).
92. See Patti A. Goldman, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies:
Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1279, 1283-85 (1992).
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While NEPA may apply to economic or commercial agree-
ments negotiated by various U.S. government agencies, a close
reading shows that it does not apply to trade agreements made
under the authorities discussed above. The NEPA requirement
applies only to "agencies." For trade agreements, however, no
agency makes a proposal for legislation.9 3 The President makes
the proposal, and the President is not an agency.9 4
NEPA probably could have been written more broadly so as
to impose such a mandate on the President.95 After all, Con-
gress imposes numerous informational requirements on the
President dealing with submissions of budget requests and
other legislation.9 6 It can be argued that, given the President's
Constitutional authority to recommend legislation to Con-
gress, 97 such requirements are only precatory.98 However, since
the President is seeking support from Congress, he is likely to
comply.
In summary, the EIS has been one of the key procedural
linchpins of U.S. environmental policy since 1970. It has forced
government agencies to incorporate environmental considera-
tions into policymaking. The EIS does not assure that a "cor-
rect" decision is made. It may, however, make that outcome
more likely.
III. THE PUBLIC CITIZEN LAWSUIT:
FAST-TRACK VS. NEPA
In August 1991, Public Citizen filed a lawsuit to compel the
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to issue an EIS on NAFTA.
The case was dismissed by the District Court for lack of standing
and by the Court of Appeals as premature.9 9 After NAFTA was
93. Any agency can recommend trade legislation, but when fast track is
used it is the President who recommends the legislation.
94. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.12 (1993). It is interesting to note that Executive Or-
der 12114 on "Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions" also ex-
empts actions taken by the President. See Executive Order No. 12114, 3 C.F.R.
356 (1980).
95. Alternatively, NEPA (or the Trade Act) could be written to require the
USTR to do an EIS for any trade agreement which is sent to Congress by the
President. Such a provision would probably be reviewable by the courts and
enforceable on the USTR.
96. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 1105 (1988).
97. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
98. For example, during the Bush Administration, the President issued bill
signing statements which characterized certain new requirements as precatory.
99. Public Citizen v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 782 F.Supp.
139 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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completed in 1992, Public Citizen went back to court to ask for
the EIS. This led to Judge Richey's decision on June 30, 1993
that the USTR was required to prepare the EIS. 100 The Clinton
Administration appealed, and on September 24, 1993, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that the EIS
was not required. 10' The Supreme Court denied certiorari on
the appeal without comment. 0 2
Public Citizen recognized that the President was not cov-
ered by NEPA and, therefore, based its case on the thesis that
the USTR, having done most of the work in negotiating NAFTA,
was a responsible agency under NEPA. It seems clear that the
USTR is an "agency."10 3 In support of this thesis, one might
note that the USTR has "lead responsibility for the conduct of
international trade negotiations."' 0 4 But lead responsibility is
not authority. When it comes to signing trade agreements 10 5
that qualify for fast track treatment, the USTR lacks such au-
thority. 10 6 It is the President who has trade agreement author-
ity. 10 7 The President does not need the concurrence of the
USTR to sign an agreement or to transmit it to Congress. In-
deed, the applicable sections of the statute do not even mention
the USTR. The President could have delegated negotiating au-
thority under the 1988 Act to the USTR, but did not do so.'o 8
Despite this legal situation, Judge Richey, in ruling at the dis-
trict court level, subscribed to the thesis that the USTR's role
100. Public Citizen v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F.Supp.
21 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and cert denied, 114 S.Ct.
685 (1994).
101. Public Citizen, 5 F.3d at 549. For further discussion of the Public Citi-
zen lawsuit, see Wendy Leigh Love, International Trade Agreements and Do-
mestic Environmental Policy: The NAFTA Example, 19 N.C. J. IN'L L. & COM.
REG. 353 (1994), and Kristin R. Loecke, The National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 and Its Implications for NAFTA: Public Citizen v. United States Trade
Representative, 23 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 603 (1993).
102. Public Citizen, 114 S.Ct. 685 (1994).
103. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2171(f) (1988) (permitting USTR to use other Fed-
eral agencies).
104. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, 93 Stat. 1381 (1979); 15 C.F.R.
§ 2001.3(a) (1994).
105. This does not include signing ad referendum. See infra note 108.
106. For the major USTR duties, see 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c)(1) (1988).
107. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2902(c), 2903(a) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
108. Certain authorities - for example, regarding telecommunications ne-
gotiations - were delegated. See Executive Order No. 12661, 3 C.F.R. 618
(1989). It is unclear whether the President can delegate his fast track
authority.
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was significant enough to trigger EIS responsibilities under
NEPA.109
The Court of Appeals decision hinged on a different (and
procedurally prior) question: Does any federal court have juris-
diction to consider such a complaint under the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA) based on a "final agency action"?'1 0 The
District Court had concluded that it did have jurisdiction be-
cause the USTR was an agency under the APA and had taken
the final agency action on NAFTA before transmission by the
President.1 1" ' The Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds
that the final action for NAFTA would be transmittal to Con-
gress by the President. 11 2 Yet, since the President is not an
agency under the APA, no judicial review would be available. 113
The Court thought it unnecessary to reach any conclusion on
other claims, such as the applicability of NEPA to trade agree-
ments.' 14 Thus, there has been no authoritative judgment on
whether Judge Richey was correct about the obligation of the
USTR to complete an EIS.
A. LOOKING BACK: THE COUNTERATTACK ON JUDGE RICHEY'S
DECISION
The Clinton Administration, many pundits and editorial-
ists, and the U.S. business community, were displeased with
Judge Richey's decision.1 5 At the time, NAFTA appeared to be
on the verge of political collapse, and it was feared that the deci-
sion might push it over the edge. Contrary to many accounts of
the decision, Judge Richey had not required the implementing
legislation to await the EIS. He said simply that he would order
an EIS to be prepared by the USTR "with all deliberate speed"
because the "statement is essential for providing the Congress
and the public the information needed to assess the present and
109. Public Citizen v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F.Supp.
21, 24-27 (D.D.C. 1993).
110. Public Citizen, 5 F.3d at 550-51. See 5 U.S.C. § 701 et. seq.
111. Public Citizen, 822 F.Supp. at 21.
112. Public Citizen, 5 F.3d at 551-52.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 552-53. It is interesting to note that following the Appeals Court
decision, Ambassador Kantor unaccountably stated that the Court found that
"NEPA does not require the Administration to prepare an environmental im-
pact statement." See Statement of Ambassador Kantor, Press Release No. 93-
64, Sept. 24, 1993 (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade).
115. See, e.g., George F. Will, Judicial Exhibitionism, WASH. POST, July 8,
1993, at A17. But see NAFTA, Meet the Environment, N.Y. TIMES, July 12,
1993, at A16 (editorial supporting Judge Richey).
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future environmental consequences of, as well as the alterna-
tives to, the NAFTA when it is submitted to the Congress for
approval." 116 Nevertheless, there was a fear that if Judge
Richey's decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the Ad-
ministration would be forced into preparing the EIS and would
be pressed by Congress not to submit NAFTA before such an
analysis was ready. It was assumed that such an analysis
would take months to prepare, thus making it impossible to pass
implementing legislation before Congress adjourned in Novem-
ber.117 Without such legislation, NAFTA could not go into force
as scheduled. Further, there was apprehension that litigation
as to the adequacy of the EIS would be initiated, thus further
delaying NAFTA." 8 Many in the trade community were also
worried about the implications of Judge Richey's decision for
other trade agreements, such as the Uruguay Round, and for
other international agreements. 119 Although the U.S. Depart-
ment of State had prepared EIS's for international agreements
in the past 120 without any obvious damage to foreign policy,
there existed a dread of new constraints.
In response to the unexpected loss, the Clinton Administra-
tion supercharged its defense efforts. The District Court deci-
sion was portrayed in apocalyptic terms. Every possible
argument was used to overturn Judge Richey's decision. 121 By
116. Public Citizen, 822 F.Supp. at 30.
117. See Casey Bukro, Nafta Environment Study May Be Incredibly Com-
plex, J. COM., July 6, 1993, at 3A. But see Gore Sees No NAFTA Approval Delay,
WASH. POST, July 3, 1993, at A14 (almost all of the work required for that kind
of an EIS has been done, Gore said).
118. See Brief for the Appellants at 25, Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 93-512), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 685
(1994) (judicial review of the adequacy of an EIS can drag on for over a decade).
119. See, e.g., Brink Lindsay, Car-Bombing by Court Ruling, J. COM., July
12, 1993, at 8A.
120. See Brief of Amici Curiae Natural Resources Defense Council et al. at
12-13, Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(No. 93-5212), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 685 (1994) (listing treaties and other ac-
tions which have been accompanied by EISs). See also 40 C.F.R § 1508.18(b)(1)
(1993).
121. A recent article in The New Yorker presents some interesting back-
ground. In 1987, Mickey Kantor represented litigants suing the city of Beverly
Hills in an effort to overturn a recently passed ordinance banning smoking in
restaurants. Kantor's lawsuit invoked every sort of argument that could be ad-
vanced to criticize the ordinance to the point where it bordered on parody. The
lawsuit stated that cleaning the air in restaurants amounted to 'altering the
indoor environment," and that would require an environmental-impact state-
ment. See Stan Sesser, Opium War Redux, NEW YORKER, Sept. 13, 1993, at 78,
83.
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contrast, much of the environmental community adopted a low-
key response, animated more by hope than by fear. Rodger
Schlickeisen, president of Defenders of Wildlife, stated that "[a]t
its core, NEPA is about [providing] important information to the
Congress and to the public, and at a time when NAFTA is en-
countering considerable political difficulty, we believe such in-
formation could actually save it."122 Kathryn S. Fuller,
president of World Wildlife Fund, suggested that "an EIS on a
900-page omnibus revision of trade between three nations may
press the utility of an EIS to its breaking point"123 Instead, she
called for better procedures for future trade agreements. 124 An
amicus brief from four other environmental groups suggested
that the uncumbersome "legislative EIS" would suffice given the
stage of NAFTA at that point.' 25
There were several arguments made against an EIS re-
quirement. First, it was argued that an EIS requirement would
be an unconstitutional constraint on the power of the President.
Second, it was argued that there was not enough time to com-
plete the EIS before NAFTA implementation legislation had to
be approved. Third, it was argued that NAFTA's impact on the
environment was too uncertain to do an EIS. Fourth, it was ar-
gued that the public participation norms of the EIS are not ap-
propriate for trade agreements. Each of these arguments is
briefly discussed below.
1. USTR and the Constitution
In its appeal of Judge Richey's decision, the Clinton Admin-
istration argued that presidential prerogatives were impermissi-
bly burdened by the district court order. It argued further that
"the President's exclusive powers are not subject to statutory
dictates or judicial oversight merely because the President
chooses to act through ambassadors or other emissaries."126 In
testimony before Congress against Judge Richey's decision, Pro-
fessor Laurence Tribe argued that construing an Act of Congress
to authorize the actions of the District Court in this case would
cause Congress to infringe both on the President's and on its
122. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 15 (statement of Rodger Schlickeisen).
123. Id. at 83 (statement of Kathryn S. Fuller).
124. See id.
125. Brief of Amici Curiae Natural Resources Defense Council, supra note
120, at 18. For the rules on legislative EISs, see 40 C.F.R. § 1506.8 (1993).
126. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 73, at 32.
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own institutional roles "by constricting the recommendations
which the President could make and which it could consider."127
The District Court did order the USTR to prepare an EIS
statement on NAFTA, 12s but it did not enjoin the submission of
NAFTA to Congress pending the completion of such an EIS.
Leaving aside the issue of whether the District Court correctly
determined NEPA's meaning, both the government and Profes-
sor Tribe argued that Congress cannot enact a statute that re-
quires the USTR to produce an EIS for any trade agreement
submitted by the President to Congress. This line of argument
seems erroneous.
Congress created the USTR and spelled out its duties in leg-
islation. There is nothing in the Constitution that prevents Con-
gress from adding the preparation of EIS's to such duties, either
in the statute creating the USTR or in NEPA. 129 Both the gov-
ernment and Professor Tribe view an analytical assignment to
the USTR as a burden or constriction of the powers of the Presi-
dent. This is an inexplicable stance given the common practice
of statutory requirements for reports from agencies and from the
President. For example, the Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act requires the President and agencies to submit a "com-
petitiveness impact statement" to Congress together with
certain proposals for legislation.1 30 Even if such rules are not
judicially enforceable on the President per se, they are nonethe-
less obligations.
2. The NAFTA Clock
In response to the District Court decision, the Clinton Ad-
ministration argued that the schedule for implementing NAFTA
did not provide enough time for the preparation of an EIS. For
example, U.S. Trade Representative Kantor portrayed the deci-
sion as "creating the potential for protracted litigation and delay
in implementing the NAFTA."13' It is interesting to note that
127. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 67-68 (NAFTA, NEPA, and the Sepa-
ration of Powers, Prepared Statement of Laurence H. Tribe before the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works, July 22, 1993).
128. Public Citizen, 822 F.Supp. 21, 30-31 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549
(D.C. Cir. 1993), and cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 685 (1994).
129. See Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524, 610 (1838) ("it would be an
alarming doctrine that Congress cannot impose upon any executive officer any
duty they may think fit").
130. 2 U.S.C. § 194b (1988). There is no private right of action, however.
131. Statement by U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, White House
Press Release, June 30, 1993 (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global
Trade).
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this theme of time-sensitivity was used by the government
throughout the litigation. For example, in October 1991, the
Bush Administration stated that there was simply not enough
time to prepare an EIS. 132
The notion that the legislative timetable precludes prepara-
tion of an EIS is unsettling. It is true that NAFTA was sched-
uled to go into effect on January 1, 1994. President Clinton
could have sent the implementing legislation to Congress as
early as January 20, 1993. He was perfectly within his rights to
delay submission until November 4, 1993. It seems rather hypo-
critical, though, to allow more than three-fourths of the year to
elapse and then complain that no time remains for completion of
an EIS. As Judge Richey pointed out in his decision, the USTR
could easily have begun the EIS process at an earlier time in the
NAFTA negotiating process. 133 In his opinion, inaction by the
prior administration led to the tight timetable for completion of
an EIS.'3 4
3. EIS Not Doable
In presenting the government's case, Solicitor General Drew
S. Days III claimed that NAFTA was so complex and far-reach-
ing that its environmental consequences were too unpredictable
to assess. 135 One government brief stated that any conclusions
that an EIS could predict regarding the "net environmental ef-
fects from the intersection of NAFTA's trade rules with develop-
ments in domestic and foreign economic environmental
regulation and enforcement" would not be credible. 136 The MTN
132. Moreover, once negotiations progress, the Trade Acts contemplate
that the President will allow only ninety days between conclusion of
negotiations ... and submission of the agreement and implementing
legislation to Congress. Ninety days are precious few, and indeed im-
possibly few, for definition, analysis and prediction of the effects of
global changes in commerce on the domestic environment of the United
States, even assuming such unlikely predictions could be made. Three
months is simply too little time to prepare an EIS ....
Motion In Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note
50, at 58.
133. Public Citizen, 822 F.Supp. 21, 30 n.15 (D.D.C. 1993).
134. Id. See also Brief of Amici Curiae Natural Resources Defense Council,
supra note 120, at 25 (USTR's argument essentially would allow any agency
wishing to avoid legal requirements to delay compliance long enough to create
an eleventh-hour conflict).
135. See Environmental Impacts of NAFTA "Impossible to Know," Justice
Says, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 13, 1993, at 1; Michael York, President Wins
One on NAFTA, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1993, at Al.
136. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 73, at 42.
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Coalition, a coalition of corporations and business associations
advocating successful completion of the Uruguay Round, in an
amicus brief offered to the Court, averred that "while environ-
mental effects ensue from the economic growth spurred by trade
agreements, they are unknowable with any precision at this
stage.137
If true, these would be strong arguments, not against the
EIS, but against NAFTA. If the government does not know, or
cannot hypothesize, what the environmental impact of NAFTA
would be, then maintaining the status quo might be the most
prudent course. In reality, the U.S. government did not enter
into NAFTA blindly; there was a great deal of analysis of envi-
ronmental issues.138 It was not beyond the capacity of human
intellect to do an EIS on NAFTA. Certainly, an EIS on NAFTA
would have been an imperfect analysis. However, all EIS's are
somewhat speculative.
4. Openness of Trade Policy
The Clinton Administration argued that the openness
norms of the EIS would conflict with fast track because the pro-
cess of public participation in the role of advising the President
on trade policy, negotiating objectives, and bargaining positions
is carefully prescribed by U.S. trade laws, and is accomplished
principally through advisory committees with a broad represen-
tation of interests. 139 The Bush Administration took a similar
line, charging that the plaintiff was actually seeking to "enlarge
the avenues of participation established under the Trade
Acts.'U40
To its credit, the Environmental Protection Agency in the
Bush Administration set up an advisory committee bringing to-
gether experts on trade and the environment. 141 Nevertheless,
such glasnost did not spread to the official trade policy advisory
137. Amicus Brief of the MTN Coalition at 2, Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade
Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 93-5212), cert. denied, 114
S.Ct. 685 (1994).
138. See, e.g., U.S. GOVERNMENT, REVIEW OF U.S.-MExIcO ENVIRONMENTAL
ISSUES (1992). This review did not meet NEPA requirements. See Daniel
Magraw, NAFTA's Repercussions: Is Green Trade Possible?, ENVIRONMENT,
Mar. 1994, at 14, 45 n.21.
139. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 73, at 13-14.
140. Motion in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
supra note 50, at 61.
141. For a discussion, see Jan C. McAlpine & Pat LeDonne, The United
States Government, Public Participation, and Trade and Environment, in
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 203 (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds, 1993).
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structure run by the USTR. Of the thirty-nine committees, none
focuses on consumer or environmental issues. 142 There is
"broad participation" of business interests, but not many human
rights organizations, public interest groups, and the like.143 It
seems contradictory to say that an EIS is unnecessary because
there are advisory committees when no advisory committee ex-
ists for the environment.14 4
There is considerable irony in the recent criticism about
U.S. trade policy being closed and secretive. When the reciprocal
trade agreement program was launched in 1934, it was viewed
as providing an unprecedented degree of public participation.
Congress required public notice of negotiations and public hear-
ings.145 President Roosevelt created a Committee on Reciprocity
Information to encourage two-way communication with the pub-
lic. 146 All this was considered a great improvement over the
traditional opaque methods used by Congress in setting tariffs.
These reforms merited at least one book.147
B. AND THE WINNER IS . . .
After Judge Richey's decision, Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade
Representative began to shape up as a historic clash between two
approaches to public policy. 148 On the one hand, there existed
the need for speedy and secret negotiations. On the other ex-
isted NEPA's policy of "deliberative consideration." As things
turned out, the denouement of Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative was anti-climactic. The contest between the linch-
142. 19 U.S.C. § 2155 (1988).
143. See Lori Wallach, Hidden Dangers of GATT and NAFTA, in THE CASE
AGAINST FREE TRADE 52-53 (Ralph Nader et al. eds., 1993).
144. President Bush did appoint five prominent environmentalists to the ad-
visory groups. See REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION ON THE NORTH AMERICAN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND ACTION TAKEN IN FULFILLMENT OF THE MAY 1,
1991 COMMITMENTS (Sept. 1992), Tab 7, at 2.
145. 48 Stat. 945 (current version codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1354 (1988)).
146. See Executive Order No. 6750 (June 27, 1934). The Committee has
since been abolished. See Executive Order No. 10004, 3 C.F.R. 819 (1948).
147. See JOHN DAY LARKIN, TRADE AGREEMENTS: A STUDY IN DEMOCRATIC
METHODS (1940).
148. As the Justice Department noted,
the hallmark of the comprehensive procedures Congress established in
the Trade Acts is expedited congressional consideration of trade agree-
ments as submitted, without consideration of alternatives and with
specifically limited venues for public participation to protect confiden-
tial aspects of trade negotiations. The hallmark of NEPA's EIS pro-
cess, by contrast, is deliberative consideration of environmental
impacts and alternative actions, with opportunities for judicial review.
Brief for the Appellants, supra note 118, at 24 (citation omitted).
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pins of trade policy and environmental policy was not settled
because the Court of Appeals decided on other grounds. 14 9 In
effect, the contest judge disqualified himself. Neither fast track
nor the EIS was declared the winner.
Some might object to this characterization and say that fast
track won. It is true that Congress approved NAFTA, in effect
choosing fast track over NEPA. It is also true that an EIS re-
quirement for trade agreements, if it exists, is not judicially en-
forceable under the present APA. 150 But the larger questions
remain unsettled: Should Congress apply NEPA to trade agree-
ments or otherwise require an environmental review as a condi-
tion of fast track? These issues are discussed below.
IV. NAFTA IMPLEMENTATION: PROMISE VS. REALITY
Since NAFTA has been in force only a few months, it is too
early to judge its environmental effects. Nevertheless, one can
begin to make such judgments about NAFTA's pre-1994 effects.
This section examines one episode regarding NAFTA's
implementation.
A. THE PROMISE
In presenting NAFTA to the public in September 1992, the
Bush Administration declared that pursuant to a Presidential
commitment, NAFTA maintains existing U.S. health, safety,
and environmental standards, and allows the United States to
prohibit the entry of products that do not meet U.S. stan-
dards. 15 ' The Clinton Administration agreed with this charac-
terization. In a major statement on the trade agreement, the
Administration declared that "[n]o existing Federal or state reg-
ulation to protect health and safety will be jeopardized by
NAFTA."1 52 A few months later, in Congressional testimony,
U.S. Trade Representative Kantor stated that "NAFTA's obliga-
tions do not threaten U.S. measures, because our regulatory sys-
149. See supra text accompanying note 110.
150. For some suggestions on amending the APA, see Wirth, supra note 75,
at 418-19.
151. EXEcUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION
ON THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND ACTIONS TAKEN IN FUL-
FILLMENT OF THE MAY 1, 1991 COMMITMENTS 5 (1992).
152. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NAFTA: CLINTON ADMINIS-
TRATION STATEMENT ON THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 8 (1993).
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tems already are non-discriminatory or science-based."1 5 3
Because Public Citizen offered a contrary view in its lawsuit, the
Justice Department set the record straight for the Court of Ap-
peals by stating that the plaintiffs' assertion of the alleged ef-
fects of NAFTA on U.S. law did not take into account the
"repeated affirmation of the signatories of their rights to main-
tain, enforce, and strengthen environmental and health and
safety measures." 15 4
B. THE REALITY
The promises from the Bush and Clinton Administrations
are not in complete accord with reality. Section 361 of the North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act' 55 (NAF-
TIA) is entitled "Agricultural Technical and Conforming Amend-
ments. 15 6 This section amends five health-related laws, in
order to conform them to NAFTA so as to avoid potential chal-
lenges. Those changes are as follows.
The Animal Diseases Act of 1890 prohibits the importation
of diseased cattle, sheep, swine, and other livestock.15 7 NAFTIA
allows the Secretary of Agriculture to permit such imports from
Mexico and Canada.' 5  The Diseases Act also requires the Sec-
retary of Agriculture to inspect all imported animals. I5 9 NAF-
TIA allows the Secretary to waive this requirement for Mexico
and Canada. 160
A section of the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibits meat imports
from countries with foot-and-mouth disease.' 6 ' NAFTIA allows
the Secretary of Agriculture to permit such importation from
any country upon a determination that the region where the
meat originates does not have any disease. 6 2
The Honeybee Act prohibits honeybee imports from coun-
tries suffering certain parasites or diseases or not maintaining
153. The Administration's Case for NAFTA, Testimony of Ambassador
Michael Kantor before the Senate Commerce Committee, October 21, 1993, at
10.
154. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 118, at 20-21.
155. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
156. Id., 107 Stat. at 2122.
157. 21 U.S.C. § 104 (1988).
158. Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 361(b), 107 Stat. 2057, 2122 (1993).
159. 21 U.S.C. § 105 (1988).
160. Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 361(c), 107 Stat. 2057, 2122-23 (1993).
161. 19 U.S.C. § 1306 (1988).
162. Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 361(d)(1), 107 Stat. 257, 2123 (1993).
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proper precautions on honeybee trade. 163 NAFTIA allows the
Secretary of Agriculture to waive these requirements for Mexico
and Canada upon a determination that the region from which
the product originates does not have the parasites or disease.164
The Poultry Product Inspection Act prohibits poultry im-
ports from countries that do not have the same poultry sanitary
and preparation standards as those in the United States.' 65
NAFTIA allows the Secretary of Agriculture to permit poultry
imports from Mexico and Canada if either country demonstrates
that its standards achieve the level of protection that the Secre-
tary considers appropriate. 66
The Federal Meat Inspection Act prohibits meat imports
produced under standards that do not comply with U.S. regula-
tions.' 67 NAFTIA allows the Secretary of Agriculture to permit
meat imports from Mexico and Canada if either country demon-
strates that its standards achieve the level of protection that the
Secretary considers appropriate.' 68
It is not clear whether these changes will impair public
health. Perhaps the laws were outdated; perhaps more adminis-
trative discretion was warranted; perhaps more deregulation
was sensible. What is clear is that the issues surrounding these
changes were not aired in public. With an EIS requirement,
they would have been. When laws have proven satisfactory for
decades, it would be reasonable for Congress to debate such
changes. The fact that these laws were changed only for Mexico
and Canada contradicts statements made by the Administration
that NAFTA and U.S. law were already in conformity, and
points to issues that remain publicly unexplored to this day.
There may be nothing wrong with altering these laws from
a health perspective. Yet such action is at variance with the re-
peated assurances of the Bush and Clinton Administrations that
NAFTA did not require the United States to change its health
laws.' 69 Some commentators have suggested that one should
163. 7 U.S.C. § 281 (1988).
164. Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 361(d)(2), 107 Stat. 257, 2123 (1993).
165. 21 U.S.C. § 466(d) (1988 & Supp. 1993). For further discussion of this
law, see Robert E. Hudec, Circumventing Democracy: The Political Morality of
Trade Negotiations, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 311, 317-20 (1993).
'166. Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 361(e), 107 Stat. 257, 2123-24 (1993).
167. 21 U.S.C. § 620(a) (1988).
168. Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 361(0, 107 Stat. 257, 2124-25 (1993).
169. It could be argued that the federal government has maintained its
health standards, and that these changes only provide more discretion to health
officials in implementation. But discretion can lead to misjudgment, which is
apparently why the Congress, before November 1993, had chosen not to grant
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not be concerned about these changes since the Clinton Admin-
istration is pro-consumer. However, the next President may
have different views and could appoint a Secretary of Agricul-
ture who is willing to use his or her new discretion to tilt toward
producer interests. The possible ramifications of such adminis-
trative discretion seem to have been swept along in the fast
track.
C. How FAST A TRACK?
Under fast track rules, the House must vote on trade imple-
menting legislation within sixty session days after the transmis-
sion of the bill by the President. 170 The House need not wait the
full sixty days, however. On November 4, 1993, President Clin-
ton submitted the implementing legislation to Congress. 171 The
House voted on November 17, 1993, which was six session days
later. The Senate voted on November 20 and the legislation was
approved. The adjournment resolution was passed on Novem-
ber 24, 1993.
Was this accomplished too quickly? Not necessarily. After
all, NAFTA had been before Congress in one form or another for
over three years. 172 There are many ways one might try to an-
swer the "too fast" question, but two will be pursued here: first,
whether it was too fast for the public to know what was going on;
and second, whether it was too fast for Congress to know what
was going on.
Although NAFTA itself had been public for a year, the im-
plementing legislation did not exist in final form until November
4. It took several days for the 146-page bill to be printed. A
person requesting a copy from the USTR was told to go the Con-
gressional document rooms. The document rooms staff stated
that the bill was being sold at the Government Printing Office.
The Government Printing Office did indeed have some copies,
but sold out almost immediately and did not restock until after
the Senate vote. Therefore, it is likely that many interested
such discretion. The decision to reverse existing law was significant enough to
warrant public discussion.
170. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(e) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
171. H.R. Doc. No. 159, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
172. President Bush gave formal notice to Congress on the negotiation with
Mexico on September 25, 1990. See Letter to the Chairmen of the Senate Fi-
nance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee on Mexico-
United States Free-Trade Negotiations, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1451
(Sept. 25, 1990). It is interesting to note that the President's notice does not
mention the words "environment" or "jobs."
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members of the public had not seen the bill before the House
voted.
Normally, when the House enacts legislation, the text of the
act is printed in that day's Congressional Record. Yet in the
case of NAFTA, the text was not printed.173 Thus, citizens
around the country, who have access to the daily Record in li-
braries, were further prevented from seeing the legislation
before the Senate voted. Thus, it does seem that the track was a
bit too fast for the interested public. The text of the bill, H.R.
3450, was added to the Lexis computer data base on November
16, the day before the House vote.
How about members of Congress? The author has no way of
knowing what individual members of Congress knew about the
changes in health laws discussed above. One might surmise
from what is on the public record that Congress had no knowl-
edge of the changes. 174 The Bush Administration's Report on
NAFTA makes no mention of the need for these changes.' 75 The
Clinton Administration's Report on NAFTA Environmental Is-
sues - of early November 1993 - makes no mention of the
need for these changes.17 6 Indeed, the Report states that the
U.S. sanitary and standards-related measures were "already" in
conformance with NAFTA. 77 The Clinton Administration's
"Statement of Administrative Action" accompanying the legisla-
tion does briefly discuss the changes, but this document is 237
pages long. l78 The information was virtually buried in text.
No hearings were held on these health changes following
the submission of the legislation on November 4. The House
Committee on Agriculture issued no report on the bill. The Sen-
ate Committee on Agriculture did issue a report on November
18, which mentioned the changes, but the report was not imme-
173. See 139 CONG. REC. H10047 (1993). The author inquired of the Record
clerk and was told that it was omitted through clerical error.
174. On October 5, 1993, the House Ways and Means Committee issued a
"NAFTA Draft Implementing Proposal," (at 7-4) which indicated that provi-
sions might be included in the bill to change listed animal, meat and poultry
laws. No details on such changes were provided in this 87-page document.
175. See REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION, supra note 144, at Tab 7 (NAFTA
and the Environment).
176. See ExECuTIvE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NAFTA: REPORT ON EN-
VIRONMENTAL ISSUES (Nov. 1993).
177. Id. at 93 (emphasis added). It also states that the "NAFTA provisions
will not require any changes to the U.S. regulatory framework" for sanitary
measures. See id. at 107.
178. H.R. Doc. No. 159, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 552-54 (1993).
19941
222 MNN. J GLOBAL TRADE
diately printed. 179 When the Secretary of Agriculture testified
before the Senate Committee on September 21 regarding
NAFTA, he made no mention of the need for these changes in
his testimony. 180 No newspaper article (contemporaneous with
the NAFTA vote) that discusses these issues has come to this
author's attention. On November 15, 1993, the Government Ac-
countability Project (GAP) sent a memo to members of Congress
warning that these changes threaten the safety of our country's
food supply. On November 16, 1993, Ralph Nader issued a
statement indicating that the implementing legislation "guts
U.S. meat, poultry and live animal inspection statutes." 8 1
These statements are probably exaggerated. What is notewor-
thy is that these alarms occurred only one to two days before the
key NAFTA vote. The fact that the GAP and Nader groups did
not learn of Section 361 until shortly before the NAFTA vote
demonstrates the success of those in the Administration who
sought to minimize awareness of these changes. One can look in
vain at both the House and Senate floor debate for any discus-
sion of these issues.'8 2 The trusting reader might construe the
silence on this issue by vociferous NAFTA opponents in Con-
gress as consent to the necessity or appropriateness of these
health policy changes. A more cynical reader might conclude
that fast track moved too quickly for Members of Congress to
become aware of Section 361.183
In conclusion, this case study illustrates four points. First,
despite repeated assurances by the Bush and Clinton Adminis-
trations that NAFTA would not interfere with U.S. health laws,
179. S. REP. No. 189, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 113-15 (1993).
180. How NAFTA Will Affect U.S. Agriculture: Hearings Before the Commit-
tee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1993)(statement of Secretary Mike Espy). According to Espy, "NAFTA does not re-
quire any changes in stringent U.S. standards for food safety, animal or plant
health, or environmental protection." Id. at 16.
181. Statement of Ralph Nader: The NAFTA Implementing Legislation Guts
U.S. Meat, Poultry and Live Animal Inspection Statutes (Nov. 16, 1993) (on file
with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade).
182. The environmental and consumer groups opposing NAFTA did not pub-
licize these changes. Perhaps they were unaware of them. They were bracing
for "attacks" on U.S. standards from Mexico and Canada after January 1. They
may not have been prepared for friendly fire.
183. Undoubtedly, some members knew about the changes - for example
those on the Agriculture committees. Indeed, the staff in the committees
worked to limit the breadth of the changes from what was originally proposed
by the Clinton Administration. The point here is that these discussions were
sub rosa.
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five such laws were changed in the implementing legislation.184
Second, the fast track procedure permitted these laws to be
changed without the public becoming aware of it and having
time to make their views known. In this one episode, the usual
checks of printed bills, public hearings, and informed floor de-
bate were not in place. Third, the implementing legislation was
drafted and considered in a process more secretive than normal
for U.S. legislation. Ironically, it validated many of the criti-
cisms by public interest groups about the opaqueness of the
trade negotiating process. 185 Fourth, a timely and comprehen-
sive EIS on NAFTA might have flagged the changes in the five
U.S. health laws, and offered an analysis of the pros and cons.
Instead, potentially significant regulatory changes were made in
a partially blind manner.
In making these judgments, the author is not implying that
members of the public (and even members of Congress) are gen-
erally fully informed as to what Congress is voting on. They are
not. But in the case of NAFTA, its implementation through fast
track exemplified - and actually accentuated - some of the
least attractive features of the U.S. legislative process.
V. CONDUCTING ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS OF
TRADE AGREEMENTS
This section attempts to weave together the previous areas
of discussion into specific policy recommendations for assessing
the environmental aspects of trade agreements. There are three
reasons for developing a new program for such assessments.
The first reason is that the "new protectionism" must be chal-
lenged if popular support is to be attained for trade agreements.
Since many of the complaints about trade are based on environ-
mental concerns, 186 clear analyses are needed in order to inform
the public debate and refute misconceptions.18 7 Second, Presi-
dent Clinton needs new fast track authority to continue the for-
184. But see the Clinton Administration's "Statement of Administration Ac-
tion" for NAFrA which lists a series of federal health and environmental meas-
ures that NAFTIA does not amend. See H.R. Doc. No. 159, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 465-66 (1993).
185. See Ralph Nader, The Corrosive Effects of NAFTA, WASH. POST, Nov.
15, 1993, at A19 (everything NAFTA touches becomes more autocratic and less
democratic).
186. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
187. See Steve Charnovitz, When Trade Meets Environment, J. COM., July
19, 1993, at 6A.
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ward momentum of trade liberalization.18 8 Incorporating
environmental reviews into this process may be necessary to get
the political support needed for fast track.' 8 9 Some procedural
reforms are also desirable in order to avoid potential abuses of
fast track authority inconsistent with democratic norms. Mak-
ing such reforms may boost the chances of re-enacting fast
track.190
Trade agreements can have effects on the environment and
public health - both positive and negative. A consideration of
these effects should be fully integrated into decisionmaking. 191
As William Snape pointed out after the government appealed
Judge Richey's decision, "[r]unning from NEPA is not good pub-
lic policy. All the statute asks is that we look before we leap." 1
92
The simplest option for conducting environmental assess-
ments would be to make NEPA applicable to trade agreements
- in effect, legislating the Richey decision.193 However, the EIS
procedure is not well-suited for this purpose. There are several
factors which would make an EIS for a trade agreement more
difficult than an EIS for projects like a highway or a dam. First,
there is a timing problem. Trade negotiations are fluid, making
it difficult to evaluate an agreement until the negotiations are
concluded. Once they are concluded, it is hard to "reopen" the
agreement to fix any environmental problems. Second, there is
an information problem. Trade negotiations tend to be con-
ducted secretly, which complicates the evaluation of options cho-
sen in relation to their alternatives. Third, there is a baseline
188. Indeed, it might be desirable to extend fast track for other interna-
tional agreements. See Steve Charnovitz, Designing American Industrial Pol-
icy: General Versus Sectoral Approaches, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 78, 82 (1993).
189. The National Wildlife Federation has made some proposals. See NA-
TIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, GREENING WORLD TRADE: ENvlRoNmNrAL CON-
DITIONS FOR THE 1993 UNITED STATES FAST-TRACK REAUTHORIZATION (1993).
190. For a discussion of the politics of fast track renewal, see Bruce Stokes,
Crash! And There Goes Fast Track, NAT'L J., July 3, 1993, at 1946.
191. It should be noted that Congress has shown a recent interest in envi-
ronmental analyses of trade agreements. "It is the sense of the Congress that
the President, in carrying out multilateral, bilateral, and regional trade negoti-
ations, should seek to... (5) include Federal agencies with environmental ex-
pertise during the negotiations to determine the impact of the proposed trade
agreements on national environmental law ... " Pub. L. No. 102-582, § 203,
106 Stat. 4900, 4905 (1992).
192. William J. Snape III, Trade Pacts Need Environmental Look, J. COM.,
Oct. 18, 1993, at 14A
193. The Journal of Commerce has editorialized for the opposite - an
amendment to NEPA to exempt trade agreements. See Legal NAFTA, J. COM.,
Oct. 1, 1993, at 6A.
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problem. Most of the factors considered in a typical EIS194 are
not the most important questions for trade agreements. 9 5
While it may be possible, in the abstract, to compare the trade
agreement with the option of not consummating the agreement,
the ramifications of rejecting a trade agreement also could entail
significant environmental impact. In other words, the "no ac-
tion" option might lead to potentially adverse reaction by other
countries. 196 Fourth, an EIS is also unsuitable because it is liti-
gable. By providing the possibility of delay, the EIS could undo
fast track and reduce the ability of the United States to negoti-
ate future trade agreements.
A better approach would be to incorporate environmental
assessments into an extension of fast track. What is needed is
an ongoing analytical process, not just a snapshot document.
The process should fulfill two needs: (1) giving government offi-
cials access to environmental expertise from within the govern-
ment as well as outside groups; and (2) providing information to
the public about the environmental issues being considered. I
will first present procedural recommendations for fast track and
then discuss some substantive aspects of an environmental as-
sessment. Some of the changes discussed below could be effectu-
ated by the USTR through the rulemaking process in the
absence of legislation.
A. AN ENVIRONMENTAL FAST TRACK
It is not possible here to provide a detailed narrative of how
the new fast track would operate. Instead, I will highlight the
proposed changes or additions to the current system.197 First,
Congress would provide environmental goals to the U.S. negoti-
ators as part of the statutory negotiating objectives that are
listed in trade legislation.' 98 Some informal objectives on "trade
194. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
195. For example, issues concerning the "short-term uses of man's environ-
ment" and "irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources" seem
inapplicable.
196. By contrast, if a dam is canceled, the river does not retaliate. The au-
thors of the EIS might discuss potential foreign reaction, but discussing this
could influence foreign reaction.
197. Professor Tribe suggests an innovative alternative: a Congressional
Office of Environmental Assessment modeled on the Office of Technology As-
sessment. See Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 13-14, 18, 28. This might be a
good idea, but cannot substitute for consideration by negotiators of potential
environmental impact.
198. For the Uruguay Round goals, see 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b), 2397 note
(1988).
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negotiations and the environment" were provided by Congress
in 1992, but these are now largely outdated.' 99
Second, the President would establish an Environmental
Policy advisory committee on trade. It should operate similarly
to (and even more cooperatively than) the Labor Policy advisory
committee, 200 by serving as a sounding board for the considera-
tion of policy alternatives. The Environmental Protection
Agency would run this new committee in the same way that the
U.S. Department of Labor runs the labor committee. The Bush
and Clinton Administrations have both resisted this idea.201 At
the beginning of any new negotiation, the President would sub-
mit an Initial Review to Congress regarding the environmental
consequences of the agreement. 20 2 The Review would indicate
how these consequences will be addressed in the negotiation.
This Review would be accompanied by the views of the Environ-
mental Policy advisory committee on the anticipated ecological
impact of the proposed Agreement.
Next, as soon as the outlines of a trade agreement are ap-
parent, the President would submit a detailed Environmental
Assessment to Congress. 20 3 At the latest, the Assessment would
be submitted thirty days after the President notifies Congress
that the intention to enter into a trade agreement exists. The
Assessment might be carried out jointly with another country
when it would be advantageous to do so, as when it is being ne-
gotiated with an adjacent country. If the implementing legisla-
tion has any environmental impact not detailed in the
Assessment, then the Assessment would be updated no later
than the date on which the implementing legislation is
submitted.
199. See Pub. L. No. 102-582, § 203, 107 Stat. 4900, 4905 (1992).
200. The Labor Policy Advisory Committee has been very critical of U.S.
trade policy in recent years. See, e.g., AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND
CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS LABOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE, NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: REPORT OF THE LABOR ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE (1992).
201. See Steve Charnovitz, NAFTA's Environmental Significance, ENV'T,
Mar. 1994, at 44. As this Article goes to press, President Clinton has an-
nounced that he will create an environmental advisory committee on trade.
However, no appointments have yet been made. See Executive Order 12905 -
Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Committee, WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
639 (Mar. 25, 1994).
202. This would be similar to the "scoping" which is now part of the EIS
process.
203. This would be earlier than called for in State Department procedures
for submitting EISs on treaties. See 22 C.F.R. § 161.5(d) (1993).
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The House would not vote on the implementing legislation
until at least fifteen calendar days have elapsed after the bill
and the accompanying documents (including the updated Envi-
ronmental Assessment) are printed and publicly available.20 4 In
addition, the President would not be permitted to initiate the
fast track procedures within thirty days of an announced Con-
gressional adjournment. 20 5 Fast track itself provides sufficient
parliamentary grease for legislative wheels. There is no need to
tilt the track by scheduling a vote near adjournment.
The current fast-track is a bit ambiguous as to whether im-
plementing legislation may include provisions not required by a
trade agreement. 20 6 It would be useful to clarify this rule to pre-
clude provisions not required by the trade agreement (as is done
in Canada).20 7 This reform would produce two useful outcomes.
First, it would make fast track fairer by denying the President
the ability to troll for votes by adding special interest items.
Congress should judge an agreement purely on its merits; that is
the best way to keep the negotiators accountable. Second, it
would reserve the fast track procedure for its intended purpose
- implementing the results of international regulations. Under
present rules, fast track may be used to raise taxes and cut enti-
tlement programs in order to offset the budget impact of the
Uruguay Round tariff reductions. 208
204. "Publicly available" means that it is available to anyone at the Con-
gressional document rooms or at the Government Printing Office. The docu-
ment rooms had copies of the NAFTA legislation, but refused distribution to
anyone other than Congressional staff.
205. To operationalize this, there could be a Congressional rule forbidding
adjournment within 30 days after trade legislation is introduced (under fast
track) if such legislation is approved.
206. Implementing legislation is defined as a bill "which contains . . . if
changes in existing laws or new statutory authority is required to implement
such trade agreement or agreements, provisions, necessary or appropriate to
implement such trade agreement. . ." 19 U.S.C. § 2191(b)(1) (1988) (emphasis
added). The strict interpretation is that only required changes can be included
when they are necessary or appropriate. The lax interpretation is that any-
thing the President considers appropriate can be included. For a discussion,
see 139 CONG. REC. S16353-54 (1993) (remarks of Senator Stevens), and 139
CONG. REC. S16359 (1993) (remarks of Senator Danforth).
207. The President might be required to explain why each provision is ger-
mane. Ultimately, however, the decision will have to be left to the President. If
the House and Senate sought to strip extraneous provisions from the bill, it
could pass both houses in a different form. This would defeat the intent of fast
track since there is no way of "fast-tracking" a conference report.
208. See Steve Charnovitz, Budget Rules and the GATT, J. COM., Mar. 7,
1994, at 8A.
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B. COMPONENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS
The Environmental Assessment should take a very broad
view of environment issues. Anything relating to public health,
renewable or non-renewable resource depletion, or ecological
change should be included if the effects are significant. Since
there is but one eco-system, the Assessment should not be lim-
ited to the environment within the land boundaries of the
United States.20 9 Nevertheless, the Assessment should focus
mainly on issues involving the U.S. economy, domestic health,
and trade that are of interest to the American public. While a
consideration of short-term effects will be of greatest interest to
users, the Assessment should also try to make a long-term pro-
jection. 210 Reviews should cover the four potential effects of
trade agreements: scale, structure, product, and regulatory. 211
Addressing these points would provide a response to the critics
of trade cited in the introduction. 21 2
Scale effects refer to the way that trade agreements expand
economic activity and growth. Although trade agreements will
always expand national income as conventionally measured, one
cannot simply translate national income into national welfare
because this omits consideration of many negative externalities
of production. For example, if as a result of Mexico's greater
production and transportation under NAFTA, pollution in-
creased, the costs of the pollution to the United States might
outweigh the benefits of the trade. Other scale effects include
mining of non-recoverable resources.
Structural effects refer to the way trade agreements change
patterns of resource use and investment in each country. For
example, if the Uruguay Round leads the United States to stop
subsidizing inefficient farming, then soil depletion and excessive
water use might be prevented. The United States might also be
interested in structural effects in other countries. For example,
it might want to avoid a trade agreement which induces Brazil
to chop down more tropical timber.
209. NEPA directs agencies to "recognize the worldwide and long-range
character of environmental problems." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(F) (1988).
210. For a discussion of "Intergenerational Conservation Assessments," see
EDITH B. WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 132-41 (1989) and refer-
ences therein.
211. See Candice Stevens, The Environmental Effects of Trade, 16 WORLD
ECON. 439 (1993) (discussing scale, structural, and product effects).
212. For a very useful discussion of environmental analysis of trade agree-
ments, see CHRISTINE C. HARWELL ET AL., FREE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A
PROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS AND CASE STUDY OF VENEZUELA 14-25 (1994).
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Product effects refer to the way trade agreements affect the
movement of products that have environmental consequences.
For example, if NAFTA leads to more shipment of hazardous
wastes in the border region, this increases the chances of an ac-
cident which could have ecological effects. New trade patterns
can also lead to the introduction of harmful non-indigenous spe-
cies, such as the zebra mussel. 213 The circle of poison regarding
pesticides is also a product effect.
Regulatory effects refer to the way trade agreements may
prevent domestic regulation from being applied to imports.214
For example, if a trade agreement dictates the use of interna-
tional standards, such as the food safety standards promulgated
by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, governments might
have to lower their current level of protection.215 Some environ-
mental assessments already consider such issues. For example,
the Canadian Government's Environmental Review of NAFTA
reports that thirty-nine percent of Canadian pesticide residue
limits are more stringent than those of Codex.216 By contrast,
neither the Bush nor the Clinton Administration provided simi-
lar U.S. data in their environmental assessments. 217 (This in-
formation is conveniently obtainable from the Canadian Review,
which reports that sixteen percent of U.S. residue limits are
more stringent than those of Codex. 218 ) The Clinton Adminis-
tration's report was especially imbalanced; it is simply a paean
to the NAFTA and its environmental side agreement, with virtu-
ally no serious analysis.
After considering all four of these effects, the Assessment
should make an overall judgment. Ideally, the environmental
advantages of a trade agreement should exceed its disadvan-
tages, although non-environmental advantages and disadvan-
tages will also have to be considered and weighed in any overall
analysis.
213. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, HARMFUL
NON-INDIGENOUS SPECIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1993).
214. See Steve Charnovitz, The Regulation of Environmental Standards By
International Trade Agreements, INT'L ENV'T REP., Aug. 25, 1993, at 631.
215. NAFTA does dictate this, but allows considerable flexibility. See id. at
633-34.
216. It was 176 out of 451 instances. See GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW 25
(1992).
217. See U.S. GOVERNMENT, supra note 138, at 211-17; EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, supra note 176, at 92-96.
218. It was 161 out of 941 instances. See GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, supra
note 216, at 25-26.
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In summary, a new system of environmental assessments
must be crafted for trade agreements. Since many of the effects
will be transborder, such assessments should ideally be carried
out cooperatively with other countries. 2 19 Extending fast track
as currently written or applying NEPA to trade agreements are
both inadequate options. It is hard to imagine how additional
assessments of national trade policies could ever be disadvanta-
geous. As the GATT "Wisemen's" report affirmed nine years
ago, "Clearer analysis and greater openness in the making of
trade policy are badly needed."2 20
VI. CONCLUSION
Conducting environmental assessments can head off con-
flict between the trade and environment camps. By calling at-
tention to any trade policy that may injure the environment,
assessments may lead to a reconsideration of that policy. By
demonstrating how freer trade can facilitate environmental im-
provements, assessments can combat ill-considered tracts
against trade. Those who argue that trade agreements are too
important, or too time-sensitive, to receive environmental scru-
tiny are exacerbating the negative perception that many envi-
ronmentalists have about international trade. The Clinton
Administration's battle against the EIS reinforced the view in
some camps that the environmental implications of NAFTA
could not withstand objective scrutiny.2 2 1
Environmental assessments are not a panacea. They will
not, overnight, lead to smarter trade policies, or smarter envi-
ronmental policies, or greater public support for international
cooperation. They may, however, lead to a better understanding
of how environmental improvement depends upon a healthy
economy and how economic prosperity depends upon a healthy
ecosystem. There is much to learn. Speak to the earth and it
shall teach thee.2 22
219. The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation calls
on governments to develop recommendations, within three years, on environ-
mental assessments of proposed projects likely to cause significant adverse
transboundary effects. See NAAEC, Sept. 13, 1993, art. 10.7, 32 I.L.M. 1480.
220. See FRITZ LEUTWILER ET AL., TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETrER FUTURE 35
(1985). The report recommends that governments produce a "protection bal-
ance sheet" and likens them to the environmental impact statements now re-
quired for construction projects in some countries. See id.
221. See, e.g., Carl Pope, Trade Secrets, SIERRA, Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 36.
222. Job 12:8 (King James).
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